could be assured. To these queries McClellan replied, *more suo,* in a long epistle,[1] addressed to the Secretary of War, in which he reviews *in extenso* the history of his command of the army from the time when he assumed it, on July 27, 1861, to the moment of writing. He discusses in detail the operations necessary to seize the point on the railroad south-westwardly of Manassas Junction. He points out that the condition of the roads is so bad that no period can be fixed for the movement, and that it may be many weeks before it can be begun. He then gives his own plan, which is to transport the army to Urbana on the lower Rappahannock, a place, he says, " easily reached by vessels of heavy draught, —neither occupied nor observed by the enemy,—- but one march from West Point, the key of that region,—and thence but two marches to Richmond.

A rapid movement on Urbana," he proceeds, " would probably cut off Magruder[2] in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly re-enforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with the co-operation of the navy, cross the James and throw ourselves in the rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us, for his position would be untenable with us on the

southern bank of the river. Should circumstances
render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we can use
Mob Jack Bay[3]; or, the worst coming to the worst,
we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with

[1] 5 W. R., 42: February 3, 1862.
* Magruder was the Confederate general who held Yorktovra and its
vicinity.
[3] Mob Jack Bay is an arm of the sea, just north of York River.